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1 Introduction
Rank-order tournaments where workers compete for given prizes or the dis-
tribution of a xed amount of bonuses are frequently used in practice. For
example, managers face relative compensation schemes (Gibbons and Mur-
phy, 1990; Eriksson 1999), workers compete for job-promotion in corporate
hierarchies (Baker et al. 1994), salesmen are compensated according to rel-
ative performance (Murphy et al. 2004), and workers compete for higher
shares in bonus-pool arrangements (see Kanemoto and MacLeod 1991, 1992
for Japanese and Rajan and Reichelstein 2006 for US rms). Basically, rank-
order tournaments always occur when relative worker performance is linked
to monetary consequences. Thus, forced-ranking systems also belong to the
class of tournament compensation schemes. Here, supervisors rate their sub-
ordinates according to relative performance given a xed distribution of dif-
ferent grades that can be assigned to the workers. Boyle (2001) points out
that about 25 percent of the Fortune 500 companies apply forced-ranking
systems to generate incentives (e.g., Cisco Systems, Intel, Sun Microsystems,
Conoco, General Electric, Enron). Forced-ranking systems can even be used
to create a kind of dismissal tournament. The most prominent advocate of
this idea is the former General Electric CEO Jack Welch who constituted
that the least 10 percent of the rated workers must leave General Electric
each year.1
Whereas most of the tournament models analyze competition between
homogeneous workers, the case of heterogeneous contestants seems to be the
more relevant one in practice.2 Our paper focuses on the optimal design of
tournaments between two heterogeneous workers. In the rst part of the
paper, we follow the previous tournament literature by analyzing a setting
where the employer chooses uniform winner and loser prizes for the workers,
1Note that a similar system has been used by Enron. Here, workers are rated on a
scale of 1 to 5 and those belonging to grade 5 were typically red within the next half of
the year.
2"Most contests in this world are among unequal contestants" (OKee¤e et al. 1984,
p. 42).
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that is winner and loser prizes do not depend on the identity of the respective
winner or loser. Note that this implies the sum of tournament prizes to be
xed. In turn, the employer cannot save wage costs by misrepresenting the
performance signal about the tournament winner and the tournament scheme
even works if the performance signal is not veriable to a third party. This
is the important self-commitment property of tournaments highlighted by
Malcomson (1984, 1986). Despite this property we show that even under
unlimited liability a tournament with uniform prizes does not lead to rst-
best e¤orts. This implementation would be too costly for the employer as
the more able worker still earns a positive rent. If workers are protected
by limited liability, the employer may benet from implementing more than
rst best e¤orts. He can use the worker competition to elicit high e¤ort
levels and, at the same time, to decrease the workersrents. The employer
will be interested to behave in this way, if heterogeneity between the workers
is not too large because otherwise creating incentives would again be rather
expensive for him.
The case of uniform prizes identies a fundamental dilemma of tourna-
ment theory: on the one hand, a tournament with uniform prizes satises
Malcomsons self-commitment constraint. On the other hand, it does not
lead to rst-best e¤orts so that there is an e¢ ciency loss. In the second
part of the paper, we show that tournaments with individual prizes that
di¤er among workers (e.g., if worker A is declared tournament winner he
may receive another prize than worker B in case of winning) can solve this
dilemma. In particular, our results show that under unlimited liability the
employer sets individual tournament prizes that (1) exhibit Malcomsons
self-commitment property and (2) implement e¢ cient e¤ort levels. The ad-
ditional self-commitment condition renders impossible for the employer to
adjust individual incentives in the tournament. Nevertheless, the employer
benets from individual prizes because they can be used to extract rents
from the workers. Under unlimited liability, this is all he needs to achieve
e¢ ciency. Under limited liability, we show that individual tournament prizes
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will work even better if the self-commitment condition can be relaxed due to
employer reputation, for example. Then the prizes can also be used as a sub-
stitute for handicaps to adjust individual incentives so that the heterogeneous
competition becomes less uneven.
Our paper is related to those few tournament models that also address the
problem of heterogeneous workers. The seminal paper by Lazear and Rosen
(1981) was the rst one that points to the ine¢ cient outcome of tournaments
between heterogeneous workers.3 If the employer can observe the workers
abilities and use handicaps, he will be able to restore e¢ cient incentives. In
our model, there only exists a binary signal on the relative performance of
the two workers, which makes the use of handicaps impossible. OKee¤e et
al. (1984) and Bull et al. (1987) distinguish two alternatives of modeling
heterogeneous contestants. On the on hand, workersproduction functions
may be additive in e¤ort and individual ability. On the other hand, work-
ers may have identical production functions but di¤erent cost functions. We
adopt the rst approach with performance being additive in e¤ort and abil-
ity.4 This setting allows a separate analysis of the two major advantages
of individual tournaments prizes extraction of worker rents and adjusting
individual incentives. Note, however, that both settings do not fundamen-
tally di¤er. Even if workers have di¤erent cost functions, the employer can
implement the rst-best solution by using individual prizes that satisfy the
self-commitment constraint.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In
Section 3, we derive the optimal tournament contract under uniform prizes.
The case of individual prizes is addressed by Section 4. In Subsection 4.1
the employer must satisfy a self-commitment constraint. The optimal tour-
nament contract without this constraint is derived in Subsection 4.2. Section
5 concludes.
3See also McLaughlin (1988, pp. 243-247).
4This approach is also used by Meyer and Vickers (1997) and Hö­ er and Sliwka (2003),
for example.
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2 The Model
Two risk neutral workers A and B are hired by a risk neutral employer E.
The two workers di¤er in their abilities aA and aB that inuence relative per-
formance. Let a = aA   aB denote the workersability di¤erence and let
w.l.o.g. worker A be the more able one so that a > 0.5 E cannot directly
observe performance but receives an unveriable relative performance signal
s that can take two possible values. We have either s = sA indicating that
worker A has performed better than B or s = sB indicating the opposite.
Note that such unveriable, ordinal binary signal renders both impossible the
use of explicit incentives (e.g., based on piece rates) and the use of individual
handicaps. E can only rely on a simple tournament in which prizes are allo-
cated according to realized rank. The signal structure can be characterized
as follows:
s =
(
sA if eA   eB +a > "
sB if eA   eB +a < ":
(1)
Here, ei (i = A;B) describes the e¤ort choice of worker i, and " an exogenous
random term (e.g., measurement error) with density g (") and cumulative
distribution function G ("). The density g (") is assumed to be unimodal
and symmetric around zero.6 Intuitively, the higher worker is e¤ort choice
the more likely the employer will receive the signal s = si. In addition,
worker B is less likely to win the tournament due to his ability decit a.
E¤ort ei entails costs on worker i (i = A;B) that are described in monetary
terms by the function c (ei) with c0 (ei) ; c00 (ei) ; c000 (ei) > 0;8ei > 0, and
c0 (0) = c (0) = 0. We assume that each worker has a zero reservation value
and is wealth-constrained so that his liability is limited to w.
Employer E is the organizer of the rank-order tournament. In the follow-
ing, we will discuss two di¤erent designs D 2 fUP; IPg. On the one hand,
E can x uniform prizes so that the tournament winner receives w1 and the
5Alternatively, we can think of a as worker As lead compared to worker B.
6The assumption of a unimodal distribution is not unusual in tournament models; see,
e.g., Dixit (1987), Drago et al. (1996), Hvide (2002), Chen (2003).
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loser w2 < w1 irrespective of which worker has performed best (D = UP ).
On the other hand, E can choose individual prizes for the winner and the
loser of the tournament so that worker A (B) receives w1A (w1B) if s = sA
(s = sB) but only w2A (w2B) if s = sB (s = sA) with w2i < w1i (i = A;B)
(D = IP ). Because of the limited-liability assumption, which has been intro-
duced in the last paragraph, the loser prizes w2, w2A and w2B are restricted
to values equal or larger than   w. Note that under uniform prizes the impor-
tant self-commitment property of tournaments emphasized by Malcomson
(1984, 1986) immediately applies whereas under individual prizes the em-
ployer may be confronted with a credibility problem: if tournament prizes
are individually di¤erent E may save labor costs by claiming that worker i is
the winner although s = sj (i; j = A;B; i 6= j). This credibility problem of
the design D = IP will be discussed in details in the following sections. E
maximizes prots  that consist of the sum of the workerse¤orts, eA + eB,
minus tournament prizes.
As a benchmark, we can calculate the workersrst-best e¤orts. In case
of e¢ cient production, both workers would maximize eA+eB c (eA) c (eB)
so that each workers rst-best e¤ort eFB is described by
1 = c0
 
eFB

: (2)
Finally, to assure existence of pure-strategy equilibria in the tournament
we assume that7
sup
e
w  jg0 (e+a) j < inf
e>0
c00 (e) (3)
with e := eA   eB, and w denoting the spread between winner and loser
prize under the respective tournament design.
7For a similar condition see Schöttner (2007).
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3 Tournaments with Uniform Prizes
We start by considering the standard case of uniform tournament prizes.
Under D = UP , the employer has no incentive to misrepresent the observed
performance signal s as in any case the worker who is declared winner receives
w1 whereas the loser gets w2. Hence, Malcomsons self-commitment property
of tournaments with unveriable signals is satised.
The optimal tournament contract (w1; w

2) under D = UP results from
solving a two-stage game where E xes the tournament prizes at stage 1
and workers observe the prizes and simultaneously choose e¤orts at stage
2. We work backwards, starting with the tournament competition between
workers A and B. Worker A (B) is declared winner (loser) of the tournament
with probability prob{s = sA} = G (eA   eB +a) according to (1). With
probability 1 G (eA   eB +a) worker B (A) becomes the winner (loser).
Worker A maximizes
EUA (eA) = w2 +wG (eA   eB +a)  c (eA)
and worker B
EUB (eB) = w2 +w [1 G (eA   eB +a)]  c (eB)
with w := w1   w2 denoting the prize spread. The equilibrium (eA; eB) is
described by the rst-order conditions8
c0 (eA) = wg (e

A   eB +a) = c0 (eB) :
Hence, the equilibrium is symmetric with (eA; e

B) = (e
; e) given by
wg (a) = c0 (e) : (4)
Equation (4) shows that equilibrium e¤ort e will be larger the higher the
8Recall that (3) guarantees existence.
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prize spread and the smaller the degree of heterogeneity between the workers
(measured by a).9
At stage 1, E anticipates the workersbehavior characterized by (4) and
chooses optimal prizes that maximize  (w1; w2) = 2e w1 w2. Besides the
incentive constraint (4), E has to take notice of the limited-liability constraint
w2    w (5)
and the participation constraints of the workers. Note that the participation
constraint for worker A can be neglected because he unambiguously earns a
positive rent: we have EUA (e) > EUB (e)  0 due to a > 0. Hence, only
worker Bs constraint matters:
w2 +w [1 G (a)]  c (e)  0: (6)
To solve Es optimization problem we set up the Lagrange function
L (e; w1; w2) = 2e   w1   w2 + 1  [w2 +w [1 G (a)]  c (e)]
+2  [wg (a)  c0 (e)] + 3  [w2 + w]
with 1; 3  0 and 2 as multipliers. The optimality conditions with respect
to e, w1, and w2 yield
@L
@e
= 2  1c0 (e)  2c00 (e) = 0 (7)
@L
@w1
=  1 + 1 [1 G (a)] + 2g (a) = 0 (8)
@L
@w2
=  1 + 1G (a)  2g (a) + 3 = 0: (9)
Conditions (8) and (9) together give 1 + 3 = 2, indicating that either
the limited-liability constraint or the participation constraint or both are
binding. This yields three di¤erent cases that are presented in the following
9Note that the last result follows from g () having a unique mode at zero.
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proposition:10
Proposition 1 There exist two cuto¤-values w1 and w2 for w with w1 > w2
so that the following results hold: If w > w1, then only the participation
constraint (6) is binding and E implements the e¤ort level e1 < e
FB with
c00 (e1) = 2g (a)
1  c0 (e1)
2G (a)  1 : (10)
If w1 > w > w2, then both participation constraint (6) and limited-liability
constraint (5) are binding and E implements e¤ort e2 with
c (e2) =
1 G (a)
g (a)
c0 (e2)  w: (11)
If w < w2, then only the limited-liability constraint (5) is binding and E
implements e¤ort e3 with c
00 (e3) = 2g (a). We have either e
FB > e1 >
e2 > e

3 or e

1 < e

2 < e

3. In the latter case, e

2 and e

3 may be larger than e
FB.
Particularly, if c0 (c00 1 (2g (a))) > 1, then e3 > e
FB.
Proof. See Appendix A.
While the less able worker will only earn a rent if his initial wealth w
is su¢ ciently small, the more able worker always realizes a positive rent.
Therefore, E does typically not implement rst-best e¤ort. Most interest-
ingly, in those cases where the limited-liability constraint is binding the em-
ployer may implement more than rst-best e¤ort. To understand this result,
note that the strength of incentives entirely depends on the winner prize if
the limited-liability constraint binds. A higher winner prize in turn a¤ects
the workers rents in three ways. First, it naturally increases these rents
since the wage payments to the workers increase. Second, a worker chooses a
higher e¤ort which further increases his rent as otherwise the worker would
have stuck to the initial e¤ort. Finally, a workers rent is reduced since his
10c00 1 () denotes the inverse of the second derivative c00 ().
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opponent increases e¤ort, too. If the third e¤ect dominates, the workers
rents are decreasing in the strength of incentives. Then E may gain from
implementing an ine¢ ciently high e¤ort just to reduce the workers rents.
Note that in a single-worker context the third e¤ect disappears. This implies
that the workers rent always increases in the strength of incentives if the
limited-liability constraint binds. Therefore, the employer never implements
an ine¢ ciently high e¤ort in the single-worker case.
Consider, for example, the case of implementing e = e3 in Proposition
1, where only the limited-liability constraint (5) is binding. Conditions (4)
and (5) lead to the optimal tournament prizes
w2 =   w and w1 =
c0 (e3)
g (a)
  w:
Inserting into the expression for worker Bs rent yields
RB = w2 +w [1 G (a)]  c (e3) =   w +
c0 (e3)
g (a)
[1 G (a)]  c (e3) :
From Proposition 1 we know that implementing e3 > e
FB implies e3 > e

1.
The proof of the proposition in Appendix A shows that in this case we have
@RB
@e3
=
c00 (e3)
g (a)
[1 G (a)]  c0 (e3) < 0:
The last result formalizes our argument: if workers earn positive rents it may
pay for the employer to use very high-powered incentives for implementing
ine¢ ciently high e¤orts. The employers labor costs for such policy are not
too large: since the participation constraint is not binding, the employer need
not compensate the workers for the additional disutility of e¤ort, which is
convex. The employer only has to pay higher tournament prizes, which are
linear in money. The excessive costs of extra e¤ort, c (e3)   c
 
eFB

, only
reduce the workersrents.
Finally, note that e3 > e
FB can only be satised if g (a) is su¢ ciently
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large and, therefore, a su¢ ciently small.11 In other words, only if the
degree of heterogeneity between the two workers is not too large and hence
competition not too uneven, the employer may prefer to create incentives in
excess of rst-best e¤ort. For su¢ ciently small values of a the incentives
are quite high as a determines the workersmarginal winning probability
in equilibrium (see equation (4)). In this case, creating incentives is not too
expensive for the employer. We can show that the condition e3 > e
FB ,
c0 (c00 1 (2g (a))) > 1 in Proposition 1 can be satised without violating
the existence condition (3). For this purpose, we have to specify the cost
function and the probability distribution. Let the workerscost function be
exponential and described by c (ei) = exp fc  eig 1 with c > 0 (i = A;B).12
The noise term is assumed to be normally distributed with " s N (0; 2).
For this parameterized setting, the condition e3 > e
FB becomes13
ln

2
c
p
22

>
a2
22
: (12)
Obviously, a has to be su¢ ciently small to make this inequality hold. For
the given cost function and the given distribution, the existence condition
(3) becomes
2
c2
p
2
exp

 1
2

< c2: (13)
We can easily check that conditions (12) and (13) are satised at the same
time for a range of parameter constellations (e.g., for c = 1:5,  = 0:5,
a = 0:01).
To sum up, on the one hand we have seen that under uniform tourna-
ment prizes (D = UP ) the employer typically does not implement e¢ cient
e¤ort levels if the limited-liability constraint is not binding E will imple-
ment ine¢ ciently small e¤orts, otherwise optimal e¤orts are either smaller
11Recall that the density g () has a unique mode at zero, implying g0 (a) < 0 as
a > 0.
12Exponential cost functions are also used elsewhere in the literature. See, for example,
Tadelis (2002).
13The calculations for the following conditions are relegated to Appendix B.
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or larger than rst-best e¤ort. On the other hand, the tournament design
D = UP exhibits Malcomsons important self-commitment property so that
tournament incentives work even under unveriable performance signals.
4 Tournaments with Individual Prizes
In this section, we consider the tournament designD = IP , where the winner
prize and the loser prize depend on the identity of winner and loser, respec-
tively. E pays the winner prize w1A (w1B) if worker A (B) is declared winner
of the tournament whereas the loser receives w2A (w2B) if s = sB (s = sA)
with w2i < w1i (i = A;B). Note that the identity of the declared winner
is veriable, but E can misrepresent the unveriable performance signal s
to save labor costs. This problem could be eliminated if the sum of winner
prize and loser prize is the same irrespective of who is declared winner of
the tournament. In the following, we will derive the optimal tournament
contract under this additional self-commitment constraint and without the
constraint.
4.1 Optimal Tournament Contract with Self-
Commitment Constraint
If the sum of loser and winner prize is xed, we have the condition
w1A + w2B = w1B + w2A (14)
as the employers self-commitment constraint. Note that this can be trans-
formed into w1A   w2A = w1B   w2B =:  ~w. Although absolute prizes may
di¤er between contestants, the xing of the total payroll implies that the
prize di¤erence is the same for A and B. This means that both workers still
have the same incentive to win the tournament and choose the same e¤ort ~e
12
characterized by the incentive constraint (4):
 ~wg (a) = c0 (~e) :
At stage 1, E maximizes ~ = 2~e w1A w2B = 2~e  ~w w2A w2B by
implementing an optimal e¤ort level ~e. Doing this, he has to consider the
incentive constraint, the limited-liability constraints and the participation
constraints of the workers. Now both participation constraints are relevant
since wages for the workers may di¤er. To obtain clear and concise results we
restrict our attention to the two polar cases where either both participation
constraints or both limited-liability constraints are binding. The remaining
intermediate cases could be derived in a similar way as in the previous section.
Proposition 2 Let w  G(a)
g(a)
  c(eFB). Then, both workersparticipation
constraints are binding and the employer implements the rst-best e¤ort, ~e =
eFB.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 2 shows that the employer may implement the rst-best so-
lution by using individual prizes even if the total prize sum is xed and
handicaps are not feasible. This di¤ers strongly from the ndings in Propo-
sition 1 where the rst-best solution was not attainable. The intuition behind
Proposition 2 is that E can fully extract the rent of worker A by reducing
both his loser and his winner prize. Then, E receives the complete surplus to
be produced and implements the e¤ort that maximizes this surplus, i.e. eFB.
Note, however, that this is only feasible if the workers are so wealthy that As
limited-liability constraint is not violated. This requires w  G(a)
g(a)
  c(eFB).
At rst sight, the result of Proposition 2 seems to be rather special since
rst-best e¤ort of each worker is the same and the equilibrium at the tourna-
ment stage is symmetric due to the uniform prize spread  ~w. However, we
can show that introducing individual cost functions ci (ei) (i = A;B), which
lead to asymmetric equilibria in the rank-order tournament, and individual
13
reservation values ui (i = A;B) will not qualitatively change the nding of
Proposition 2:
Corollary 1 Let the workers A and B have di¤erent cost functions cA (eA)
and cB (eB), and di¤erent reservation values uA 6= uB. If the workers are suf-
ciently wealthy, the optimal tournament contract will still implement rst-
best e¤ort for each worker.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The result of this corollary is important since it solves a fundamental
dilemma of tournament theory: on the one hand, previous models solely
rely on uniform prizes so that the self-commitment property of tournaments
applies; on the other hand, mixed tournaments between heterogeneous con-
testants lead to an ine¢ cient outcome under uniform prizes.14 The result of
Corollary 1 points out that the employer gets rid of this problem by using in-
dividual tournament prizes that both satisfy the self-commitment condition
(14) and implement e¢ cient e¤ort levels for both workers. As the employer
receives total e¢ ciency gains he will optimally choose this tournament con-
tract.
Now, we turn to the other polar case. If workers are not very wealthy
both limited-liability constraints will be binding. Then individual prizes do
not perform better than uniform ones.
Proposition 3 Let w  (1 G(a))c0(~e)
g(a)
  c(~e). Then both workers limited-
liability constraints are binding and w1A = w

1B, w

2A = w

2B =   w. The
employer implements e¤ort ~e dened by c00 (~e) = 2g (a).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 shows that individual prizes lead to the same outcome as
uniform ones if both limited-liability constraints bind. Here, E cannot reduce
14See Proposition 1. On the ine¢ ciency of mixed tournaments see also Lazear and Rosen
(1981) and McLaughlin (1988, pp. 243-247).
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worker As wages since lowering the loser prize is prevented by the workers
limited wealth. Accordingly, the employer is not able to extract even a small
part of As rent. Note that the cuto¤ for w in Proposition 3 is identical
with w2 in Proposition 1 (see Appendix A). Hence, if the workers initial
wealth is smaller than w2 the employer will be indi¤erent between uniform
and individual prizes as both tournament designs yield exactly the same
(ine¢ cient) e¤ort level. In fact, optimal individual prizes are the same for
both contestants, i.e. we have a uniform prize structure.
In all intermediate cases where not both participation constraints or both
limited-liability constraints bind, we obtain a contract that lies between the
two polar cases of Propositions 2 and 3. In particular, individual prizes help
the employer to increase his prot compared to uniform ones, while the rst-
best solution is not implemented. The proof is by solving the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions derived in Appendix C. As it is very similar to the procedure in
the proof of Proposition 1, we leave it out.
To summarize the ndings of this subsection, individual prizes that satisfy
the self-commitment property (14) (weakly) dominate uniform prizes from
the employers viewpoint. The self-commitment property implies that under
tournament design D = IP each worker faces the same prize spread so that
individual prizes cannot be used to make the tournament competition less
uneven by using individually adjusted incentives. In other words, because
of the additional condition (14) individually tournament prizes cannot serve
as a substitute for handicaps, which were impossible in the given setting.
Nevertheless, the employer prefers the design D = IP to D = UP since
individual prizes will be useful to extract rents from the workers if they are
su¢ ciently wealthy.
4.2 Optimal Tournament Contract without Self-
Commitment Constraint
In this subsection, we relax the restriction (14) that the total payroll is xed.
This implies that incentives and e¤orts may now di¤er between contestants.
15
This assumption may be justied if the workers stay for more than one period
within the rm so that an opportunistic decision by the employer would
trigger a punishment in terms of lower future e¤orts by the workers. E may
then not want to misrepresent the tournament outcome, as otherwise the
workers would lose trust in him.15
Again, we restrict our attention to the two polar cases where either the
workersinitial wealth is very high or very low. Building on the analysis of
the previous subsection, the former case is straightforward to solve: we have
seen that the rst-best solution is implemented if the players are su¢ ciently
wealthy. Of course, this result continues to hold since we have removed
a constraint from the optimization problem and, hence, make it easier to
achieve the e¢ cient solution.
The solution to the latter case, which will be discussed in the remainder of
this subsection, is not straightforward. To simplify notation let the workers
initial wealth be limited to w = 0 so that the limited-liability constraints are
w2A  0 and w2B  0. Note that in this case we can ignore the workers
participation constraints: by accepting the contract and choosing zero e¤ort
each worker can ensure himself a non-negative expected income, which is at
least as large as his zero reservation value. Of course, the workers may even
increase their expected incomes by choosing strictly positive e¤ort levels.
Altogether, under the limited-liability constraints w2A  0 and w2B  0
both workers will always accept the o¤ered contract and realize nonnegative
rents.
Without self-commitment constraint (14), each worker i (i = A;B) faces
an individual prize spread wi := w1i   w2i where wA may be di¤erent
from wB. At stage 2, the workers now maximize
EUA (eA) = w2A +wAG (eA   eB +a)  c (eA)
and EUB (eB) = w2B +wB [1 G (eA   eB +a)]  c (eB)
15See MacLeod (2003) for very similar arguments.
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leading to the rst-order conditions that characterize the equilibrium (eA; e

B):
F1 := wAg (a+ e

A   eB)  c0 (eA) = 0 (15)
and F2 := wBg (a+ eA   eB)  c0 (eB) = 0: (16)
Obviously, if wA 6= wB we will no longer have a symmetric equilibrium
in the tournament game. Still, we can analyze the workersinteraction with
respect to changes in the two prize spreads wA and wB. By implicitly
di¤erentiating the system of equations (15) and (16) we obtain
jJ j =

@F1
@eA
@F1
@eB
@F2
@eA
@F2
@eB
 =
 EU 00A (eA)  wAg0 (a+ eA   eB)wBg0 (a+ eA   eB) EU 00B (eB)

= EU 00A (e

A)  EU 00B (eB) + wAwB [g0 (a+ eA   eB)]2 > 0
for the Jacobian determinant with EU 00A (e

A) = wAg
0 (a+ eA   eB)  
c00 (eA) < 0 and EU
00
B (e

B) =  wBg0 (a+ eA   eB)   c00 (eB) < 0 due
to (3), and
@eA
@wA
=
1
jJ j
  
@F1
@wA
@F1
@eB
  @F2
@wA
@F2
@eB
 =  g  ( wBg
0   c00 (eB))
jJ j > 0
@eA
@wB
=
1
jJ j
  
@F1
@wB
@F1
@eB
  @F2
@wB
@F2
@eB
 =  g wA  g
0
jJ j
@eB
@wA
=
1
jJ j

@F1
@eA
  @F1
@wA
@F2
@eA
  @F2
@wA
 = g wB  g
0
jJ j
@eB
@wB
=
1
jJ j

@F1
@eA
  @F1
@wB
@F2
@eA
  @F2
@wB
 =  g  (wAg
0   c00 (eA))
jJ j > 0
for the comparative statics with g := g (a+ eA   eB) and g0 := g0(a +
eA   eB). Therefore, each workers equilibrium e¤ort increases in his own
prize spread whereas a workers reaction to an increase in his opponents
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prize spread depends on whether this increase makes competition more or
less uneven. Consider, for example, the case of @eA=@wB. If a+ eA > eB
we are at the right-hand side of the probability distribution where we have
g0 < 0 because of gs unique mode at zero. In this situation, initially worker A
is the stronger player. If now worker Bs prize spread increases, competition
will become less uneven. Consequently, B increases his e¤ort and A increases
his e¤ort as well: @eA=@wB > 0.
At stage 1, E maximizes his expected prot
 = eA + e

B  G (a+ eA   eB) (w1A + w2B)
  [1 G (a+ eA   eB)] (w1B + w2A)
= eA + e

B + (wB  wA)G (a+ eA   eB)  w1B   w2A:
Recall that ei = e

i (wi;wj) (i = A;B). When deriving the optimal
tournament prizes, rst consider w1A and w2A. In the optimum, we must have
that @=@w1A  0 and @=@w2A  0. Since @wA=@w1A =  @wA=@w2A,
from Es objective function we obtain
@
@w2A
=   @
@w1A
  1:
E will always choose an interior solution for the winner prize (that is w1A >
0) since zero incentives cannot be optimal because of c0 (0) = 0. Hence,
@=@w1A = 0, which implies @=@w2A =  1 < 0 and, therefore, a corner
solution for the loser prize: w2A = 0. Analogously, we get w

2B = 0 and
w1B > 0. This is intuitive. If E wants to lower the incentives of a worker,
it is always cheaper to decrease the winner prize than to increase the loser
prize. Therefore, the two loser prizes are set equal to the lowest possible
level.
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By inserting w2A = w

2B = 0, Es objective function boils down to
 = eA + e

B + (w1B   w1A)G (a+e)  w1B where e := eA   eB
with
@e
@w1A
=
g  c00 (eB)
jJ j > 0 and
@e
@w1B
=  g  c
00 (eA)
jJ j < 0:
The rst-order conditions for the optimal winner prizes are
@
@w1A
=
@eA
@w1A
+
@eB
@w1A
+ (w1B   w1A) @e

@w1A
 g  G = 0
@
@w1B
=
@eA
@w1B
+
@eB
@w1B
+ (w1B   w1A) @e

@w1B
 g   (1 G) = 0
with G := G (a+e). These conditions can be simplied to
@
@w1A
= g 

2w1Bg
0 + c00 (eB) (1 + (w1B   w1A) g)
jJ j  
G
g

= 0
@
@w1B
= g 
 2w1Ag0 + c00 (eA) (1  (w1B   w1A) g)
jJ j  
1 G
g

= 0:
Inspection of the last two equations leads to the following result:
Proposition 4 If w = 0 and E does not have to consider the self-commitment
constraint the optimal prizes are w2A = w

2B = 0 and w

1B > w

1A > 0, imply-
ing eA < e

B.
Proof. The claim w2A = w

2B = 0 has already been proved. To prove that
w1B > w

1A it su¢ ces to show that
@
@w1B

w1A=w1B
>
@
@w1A

w1A=w1B
;8w1A = w1B (17)
Since w1A = w1B =: w implies ei = e

j =: e
 we have
@
@w1A

w1A=w1B
= g (a)

2wg0 (a) + c00 (e)
jJ j  
G (a)
g (a)

@
@w1B

w1A=w1B
= g (a)
 2wg0 (a) + c00 (e)
jJ j  
1 G (a)
g (a)

:
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Because of g0 (a) < 0 and G (a) > 1
2
inequality (17) is satised. eA < e

B
immediately follows from the optimal tournament prizes together with (15)
and (16).
The intuition for the result of Proposition 4 is the following: the smaller
a + eA   eB the larger will be the workersmarginal winning probability
g (a+ eA   eB) and, hence, the larger will be overall e¤orts because com-
petition becomes less uneven.16 Inducing eA < e

B via w

1B > w

1A exactly
serves this purpose. Therefore, without self-commitment constraint, individ-
ual tournament prizes are used by employer E as a substitute for handicaps
to make competition more even.
To sum up, the analysis of the tournament designD = IP has shown that
the use of individual tournament prizes has two major advantages for the em-
ployer. First, individual prizes can be used to extract rents from the workers
when the employer has to satisfy a self-commitment constraint. Second, if
this constraint is skipped the employer will further use individual prizes to
adjust individual incentives so that competition becomes more balanced.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that individual tournament prizes dominate
uniform ones. If the employer has to satisfy an additional self-commitment
condition, individual prizes will be helpful for extracting rents from the work-
ers. If the employer does not have to care for the self-commitment property
of the announced tournament prizes, individual prizes exhibit a further ad-
vantage. Now they can be used as a substitute for handicaps when adjusting
individual incentives in order to make the tournament competition more even.
The case of individual prizes without self-commitment constraint could
be supplemented by deriving optimal self-enforcing agreements between the
workers and the employer within an innitely repeated game. On the on
16This can be directly seen from (15) and (16).
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hand, if the employer is not su¢ ciently patient he might renege on the im-
plicit contract. Reneging can be protable for the employer since optimal
individual tournament prizes di¤er so that the employer can realize a short-
term advantage by claiming a wrong tournament winner and saving labor
costs. The larger tournament prizes and, in particular, the larger the dif-
ferences between the prizes the stronger will be the employers incentive to
renege on the contract. On the other hand, innite repetition of the basic
tournament game at stage 2 may provide the opportunity for the workers to
form a stable collusion, thus reducing overall e¤orts. High tournament prizes
might help to destabilize the collusion. The optimal tournament contract
must address both problems.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
If only (6) is binding we will have 1 = 2 and 3 = 0. Inserting into (8) and
(7) yields
2 =
2G (a)  1
g (a)
and c00 (e1) = 2g (a)
1  c0 (e1)
2G (a)  1 : (18)
Since the left-hand side of the last equality is positive, comparison with (2)
immediately shows that e1 < e
FB.
If only (5) is binding (that is 1 = 0 and 3 = 2) conditions (7) and (8)
together give
c00 (e3) = 2g (a) : (19)
(19) and (2) show that if c00 1 (2g (a)) > c0 1 (1) we will have e3 > e
FB.
If both (6) and (5) are binding so that 1; 3 > 0 the two binding con-
straints together with (4) lead to (11). From equations (7) and (8) we obtain
2 =
2 [1 G (a)]  c0 (e2)
[1 G (a)] c00 (e2)  c0 (e2) g (a)
and
1 =
c00 (e2)  2g (a)
[1 G (a)] c00 (e2)  c0 (e2) g (a)
: (20)
Condition 1 + 3 = 2 leads to
3 =
2g (a) (1  c0 (e2))  (2G (a)  1) c00 (e2)
[1 G (a)] c00 (e2)  c0 (e2) g (a)
: (21)
If the denominator in (20) and (21) is positive, 1; 3 > 0 yields
c00 (e2) > 2g (a) and c
00 (e2) < 2g (a)
1  c0 (e2)
2G (a)  1 :
Comparison with (19) and (18) shows that e2 > e

3 and e

2 < e

1 < e
FB. If the
22
denominator in (20) and (21) is negative, 1; 3 > 0 implies
c00 (e2) < 2g (a) and c
00 (e2) > 2g (a)
1  c0 (e2)
2G (a)  1
and together with (19) and (18) e2 < e

3 and e

2 > e

1.
Finally, we have to prove the claim on the cuto¤-values w1 and w2 for w
with w1 > w2. In the case of e1, the non-binding limited-liability constraint
(5) yields
w >
c0 (e1)
2g (a)
2 [1 G (a)]  c (e1) =: w1
whereas in the case of e3 we obtain from the non-binding participation con-
straint (6)
w <
c0 (e3)
2g (a)
2 [1 G (a)]  c (e3) =: w2:
Dene
f (x) :=
c0 (x)
2g (a)
2 [1 G (a)]  c (x) :
To show that w1 > w2 , f (e1) > f (e3) we must have that e1 > e3 )
f 0 (x) > 0, 8x 2 [e3; e1], but e1 < e3 ) f 0 (x) < 0, 8x 2 [e1; e3]. Consider
f 0 (x) :=
c00 (x)
2g (a)
2 [1 G (a)]  c0 (x) : (22)
In case of e1 > e

3, the comparison of (18) and (19) implies
(1 c0(e1))
2G(a) 1 >
1 , 2 [1 G (a)] > c0 (e1) and hence 2 [1 G (a)] > c0 (x), 8x 2 [e3; e1].
Together with (19) we immediately obtain f 0 (e3) > 0 from (22). Since c
00 ()
is monotonically increasing, we also must have that f 0 (x) > 0, 8x 2 (e3; e1].
If e1 < e

3 we will have 2 [1 G (a)] < c0 (x), 8x 2 [e1; e3]. Now, (19) leads
to f 0 (e3) < 0. Monotonicity of c
00 () yields f 0 (x) < 0, 8x 2 [e1; e3), which
completes the proof.
Appendix B: Derivation of (12) and (13)
First, we can calculate e3. Because of the exponential cost function and the
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normal distribution, c00 (e3) = 2g (a) can be written as
c2 exp fce3g =
2p
22
exp

 a
2
22

,
e3 =
1
c

ln

2
c2
p
22

  a
2
22

:
Equation (2) for the rst-best e¤ort yields
eFB =
1
c
ln

1
c

so that we obtain
e3 > e
FB , ln

2
c
p
22

>
a2
22
:
Note that the right-hand side of the existence condition (3) boils down to c2.
The left-hand side of (3) (LHS(3)) can be written as
max
x
w
 
 (a+ x)
3
p
2
exp
(
 (a+ x)
2
22
)!
:
Di¤erentiating with respect to x and noting that the maximum satises a+
x < 0, we obtain the solution x =   ( +a). Inserting into the LHS(3)
gives
w

1
2
p
2
exp

 1
2

:
Recall that w =
c0(e3)
g(a)
with
c0 (e3) = c exp fce3g = c exp

ln

2
c2
p
22

  a
2
22

=
2
c
p
22
exp

 a
2
22

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and
g (a) =
1p
22
exp

 a
2
22

so that
c0(e3)
g(a)
= 2
c
. Altogether, for the LHS(3) we have
2
c2
p
2
exp

 1
2

;
and for (3) the parameterized version (13).
Appendix C: Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
With individual prizes and a xed prize sum, the employer maximizes ~ =
2~e  ~w   w2A   w2B subject to
w2A +G (a) ~w   c (~e)  0 (PCA)
w2B + (1 G (a)) ~w   c (~e)  0 (PCB)
 ~wg (a) = c0 (~e) (IC)
w2A    w (LLA)
w2B    w: (LLB)
The Lagrangian is given by
L = 2~e  ~w   w2A   w2B + 1 (w2A +G (a) ~w   c (~e))
+2 (w2B + (1 G (a)) ~w   c (~e)) + 3 ( ~wg (a)  c0 (~e))
+4 (w2A + w) + 5 (w2B + w) :
Di¤erentiating with respect to w2A and w2B, we obtain
@L
@w2A
=  1 + 1 + 4 != 0 and @L
@w2B
=  1 + 2 + 5 != 0:
This means that for each worker the participation constraint, the limited-
liability constraint or both must bind. Assume 1 = 2 = 1, 4 = 5 = 0 in
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which case both participation constraints are binding. Moreover, di¤erentiate
the Lagrangian with respect to ~e and  ~w. We get
@L
@~e
= 2  1c0 (~e)  2c0 (~e)  3c00 (~e) != 0
@L
@ ~w
=  1 + 1G (a) + 2 (1 G (a)) + 3g (a) != 0:
Using 1 = 2 = 1, 4 = 5 = 0 it is straightforward to show that the
conditions yield c0 (~e) = 1 so that ~e = eFB.
It remains to check that the contract does not violate the limited-liability
constraints. As both participation constraints are binding, worker A receives
a lower loser prize than worker B. Hence, we must check that
w2A = c
 
eFB
 G (a) c0(eFB)
g (a)
   w
This is equivalent to w   c  eFB+ G(a)
g(a)
and coincides with the condition
in Proposition 2. This completes the proof of this proposition.
To prove Proposition 3 as well, suppose now 1 = 2 = 0, 4 = 5 = 1
in which case both limited-liability constraints are binding. From the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions derived before, it directly follows that 2 3c00 (~e) = 0 and
 1 + 3g (a) = 0 which yields c00 (~e) = 2g (a). As both loser prizes are
equally high, the winner prizes must be equally high, too. Finally, we have to
show that the participation constraints are not violated. Since both workers
receive the same wages, Bs participation constraint is the relevant one. This
constraint simplies to
  w + (1 G (a)) c
0 (~e)
g (a)
  c (~e)  0
, w  (1 G (a)) c
0 (~e)
g (a)
  c (~e) ;
which completes the proof of Proposition 3.
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Appendix D: Proof of Corollary 1
Due to di¤erent cost functions, the workersrst-best e¤orts eFBA and e
FB
B ,
described by 1 = c0i (ei) (i = A;B), will also di¤er. The equilibrium at stage
2 is characterized by the workersrst-order conditions
 ~wg (eA   eB +a) = c0A (eA) and  ~wg (eA   eB +a) = c0B (eB) :
In addition, the workersparticipation constraints are
w2A + ~wG (eA   eB +a)  cA (eA)  uA and
w2B + ~w [1 G (eA   eB +a)]  cB (eB)  uB:
By choosing  ~w = 1=g
 
eFBA   eFBB +a

, employer E can implement rst-
best e¤orts for both workers. If the workers are su¢ ciently wealthy, they are
not protected by limited liability and E is indeed interested in e¢ ciency17:
the optimal tournament prizes
w2A = uA + cA
 
eFBA
  G  eFBA   eFBB +a
g (eFBA   eFBB +a)
w1A = uA + cA
 
eFBA

+
1 G  eFBA   eFBB +a
g (eFBA   eFBB +a)
w2B = uB + cB
 
eFBB
  1 G  eFBA   eFBB +a
g (eFBA   eFBB +a)
w1B = uB + cB
 
eFBB

+
G
 
eFBA   eFBB +a

g (eFBA   eFBB +a)
extract all rents and, at the same time, fulll the employers self-commitment
constraint (14).
17Of course, the sum of the workersreservation values must not exceed the rst-best
surplus, as otherwise the employer would not want to hire the workers at all.
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